What You See May Not Be What You Get: UCB Bandit Algorithms Robust to
  {\epsilon}-Contamination by Niss, Laura & Tewari, Ambuj
What You See May Not Be What You Get:
UCB Bandit Algorithms Robust to ε-Contamination
Laura Niss, Ambuj Tewari
University of Michigan
Abstract
Motivated by applications of bandit algorithms in educa-
tion, we consider a stochastic multi-armed bandit problem
with ε-contaminated rewards. We allow an adversary to
give arbitrary unbounded contaminated rewards with full
knowledge of the past and future. We impose the con-
straint that for each time t the proportion of contaminated
rewards for any action is less than or equal to ε. We derive
concentration inequalities for two robust mean estimators
for sub-Gaussian distributions in the ε-contamination con-
text. We define the ε-contaminated stochastic bandit prob-
lem and use our robust mean estimators to give two vari-
ants of a robust Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algo-
rithm, crUCB. Using regret derived from only the under-
lying stochastic rewards, both variants of crUCB achieve
O(√KT log T ) regret for small enough contamination pro-
portions. Our simulations assume small horizons, reflect-
ing the newly explored setting of bandits in education. We
show that in certain adversarial regimes crUCB not only
outperforms algorithms designed for stochastic (UCB1)
and adversarial (EXP3) bandits but also those that have
“best of both worlds” guarantees (EXP3++ and Tsallis-
Inf) even when our constraint on the proportion of con-
taminated rewards is broken.
1 INTRODUCTION
We first review the problem of stochastic multi-armed ban-
dits (sMAB) with contaminated rewards, or contaminated
stochastic bandits (CSB). This scenario assumes that re-
wards associated with an action are sampled i.i.d. from a
fixed distribution and that the learner observes the reward
after an adversary has the opportunity to contaminate it.
The observed reward can be unrelated to the reward dis-
tribution and can be maliciously chosen to fool the learner.
An outline for this setup is presented in Section 2.
We are primarily motivated by the use of bandit al-
gorithms in education, where the rewards often come di-
rectly from human opinion. Whether responses come from
undergraduate students, a community sample, or paid par-
ticipants on platforms like MTurk, there is always reason
to believe some responses are careless or inattentive to
the question or could be assisted by bots (Curran, 2016;
Necka et al., 2016).
An example in education is a recent paper testing ban-
dit Thompson sampling to identify high quality student
generated solution explanations to math problems using
MTurk participants (Williams et al., 2016). Using a rating
between 1-10 from 150 participants, the results showed
that Thompson sampling identified participant generated
explanations that when viewed by other participants sig-
nificantly improved their chance of solving future prob-
lems compared to no explanation or “bad” explanations
identified by the algorithm. While the proportion of con-
taminated responses will always depend on the popula-
tion, recent work suggests even when screening out fraud-
ulent participants, between 2−30% of MTurk participants
give low-quality samples (Ahler, Roush, and Sood, 2019;
Necka et al., 2016; Ryan, 2018). This is consistent with
measurements of careless and inattentive responses seen
in survey data, which reports 1 − 30% with an estimated
mode of 8−12%, with the conclusion that these responses
are generally not a random sample (Curran, 2016). Ac-
counting for these low quality responses is especially rele-
vant in educational setting where the number of iterations
an algorithm can run is often significantly smaller than
those used by big tech (e.g. advertising).
Recent work in CSB has various assumptions on the
adversary, the contamination, and the reward distributions.
Many papers require the rewards and contamination to be
bounded (Gupta, Koren, and Talwar, 2019; Kapoor, Pa-
tel, and Kar, 2018; Lykouris, Mirrokni, and Leme, 2018).
Others do not require boundedness, but do assume that the
adversary contaminates uniformly across rewards (Altschuler,
Brunel, and Malek, 2019). All works make some assump-
tion on the number of rewards for an action an adversary
can contaminate. We discuss previous work more thor-
oughly in Section 3.
Our work expands on these papers by allowing for a
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full knowledge adaptive adversary that can give unbounded
contamination in any manner. However, there is a trade
off when compared to work assuming bounded rewards
and contamination: we require an estimate of the upper
bound on the reward variance. This can often allow for
simpler implementation than some algorithms that require
boundedness, as we will discuss in section 4. Our con-
straint on the adversary is that for some fixed ε, no more
than ε proportion of rewards for an action are contami-
nated. We provide a ε-contamination robust UCB algo-
rithm by first proving concentration inequalities for two
robust mean estimators in the ε-contamination context.
We are able to show that the regret of our algorithm ana-
lyzed on the true reward distributions is O(√KT log T )
provided that the contamination proportion is small enough.
Through simulations, we show that with a Bernoulli ad-
versary, our algorithm outperforms algorithms designed
for stochastic (UCB1) and adversarial (EXP3) bandits as
well as those that have “best of both worlds” guarantees
(EXP3++ and TsallisInf) even when our constraint on the
adversary is broken.
Though we are motivated by of bandit algorithms ap-
plications in education and use this context to determine
appropriate parameters in the simulations, we point out
opportunities for CSB modeling to arise in other contexts
as well.
Human feedback: There is always a chance that hu-
man feedback is careless or inattentive, and therefore is
not representative of the underlying truth related to an
action. This may appear in online surveys that are used
for A/B testing, or as is the case above in the explanation
generation example. Adaptive surveys, such as choosing
question ordering to minimize dropout rates, are also an
example where the sample sizes can be small compared
to other bandit deployments.
Click fraud: Internet users who wish to preserve pri-
vacy can intentionally click on ads to obfuscate their true
interests either manually or through browser apps. Sim-
ilarly, malware can click on ads from one company to
falsely indicate high interest, which can cause higher rank-
ings in searches or more frequent use of the ad than it
would otherwise merit (Crussell, Stevens, and Chen, 2014;
Pearce et al., 2014).
Measurement errors: If rewards are gathered through
some process that may occasionally fail or be inaccurate,
then the rewards may be contaminated. For example, in
health apps that use activity monitors, vigorous movement
of the arms may be perceived as running in place (Bai et
al., 2018; Feehan et al., 2018).
2 PROBLEM SETTING
Here we specify our notation and present the ε-contaminated
stochastic bandit problem. We then argue for a specific
notion of regret for CSB. We compare our setting to oth-
ers current in the field in section 3.
Notation We use [K] to represent {1, ...,K} forK ∈ R
to represent the number of actions and the indicator func-
tion I{·} to be 1 if true and 0 otherwise. Let Na(t) be
the number of times action a has been chosen at time t
and xa(t) = {xa(1), ..., xa(Na(t))} to be the vector of
all observed rewards for action a at time t. The subop-
timality gap for action a is ∆a and we define ∆min =
mina∈[K] ∆a.
2.1 ε-CONTAMINATED STOCHASTIC BAN-
DITS
A basic parameter in our framework is ε, the fraction of
rewards for an action that the adversary is allowed to con-
taminate. Before play, the environment picks a true re-
ward ra(t) ∼ Da from fixed distribution Da for all a ∈
[K] and t ∈ [T ]. The adversary observes these rewards
and then play begins. At time t = 1, 2, ..., T the learner
chooses an action At ∈ [K] . The adversary sees At then
chooses an observed reward xAt(t) and then the learner
observes only xAt(t).
We present the contaminated stochastic bandits game
in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Contaminated Stochastic Bandits
input: Number of actions K, time horizon T .
fix : ra(t) ∀a ∈ [K], t ∈ [T ].
Adversary observes fixed rewards.
for t = 1, ..., T do
Learner picks action At ∈ [K].
Adversary observes At and chooses xAt(t).
Learner observes xAt(t).
end
We allow the adversary to corrupt in any fashion as
long as for every time t there is no more than an ε-fraction
of contaminated rewards for any action. That is, we con-
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strain the adversary such that,
∀a ∈ [K], ∀t ∈ [T ],
Na(t)∑
i=1
I{ra(i) 6= xa(i)} ≤ ε ·Na(t).
We allow the adversary to give unbounded contamination
that can be chosen with full knowledge of the learner’s
history as well as current and future rewards. This set-
ting allows the adversary to act differently across actions
and places no constraints on the contamination itself, but
rather the rate of contamination.
2.2 NOTION OF REGRET
A traditional goal in bandit learning is to minimize the
observed cumulative regret gained over the total number
of plays T . Because the adversary in this model can affect
the observed cumulative regret, we argue to instead use
a notion of regret that considers only the underlying true
rewards. We call this uncontaminated regret and give the
definition below for any time T and policy pi in terms of
the true rewards r,
R¯T (pi) = max
a∈[K]
E
[ T∑
t=1
ra(t)−
T∑
t=1
rAt(t)
]
. (2.1)
This definition eq. (2.1) is first mentioned in Kapoor, Pa-
tel, and Kar (2018) along with another notion of regret
that compares the sum of the observed (possibly contami-
nated) rewards to the sum of optimal, uncontaminated re-
wards,
R¯T (pi) = max
a∈[K]
E
[ T∑
t=1
ra(t)−
T∑
t=1
xAt(t)
]
. (2.2)
We argue that eq. (2.2) gives little information about the
performance of an algorithm. This notion of regret can
be negative, and with no bounds on the contamination it
can be arbitrarily small and potentially meaningless. We
believe that any regret that compares a true component
to an observed (possibly contaminated) component is not
a useful measure of performance in CSB as it is unclear
what regret an optimal strategy should produce.
3 RELATED WORK
We start by briefly addressing why adversarial and “best
of both world” algorithms are not optimized for CSB. We
then cover relevant work in robust statistics, followed by
current work in robust bandits and how our model differs
and relates.
3.1 ADVERSARIAL BANDITS
Adversarial bandits with an oblivious environment allows
the adversary to first look at the learners policy and then
choose all rewards before the game begins. If the learner
chooses a deterministic policy, the adversary can choose
rewards such that the learner cannot achieve sublinear worst-
case regret (Lattimore, 2018). Algorithms such as EXP3
(Auer, Nicolo` Cesa-Bianchi, et al., 2002) are thus ran-
domized, but their regret is analysed with respect to the
best fixed action where “best” is defined using the ob-
served rewards. There are no theoretical guarantees with
respect to the uncontaminated regret, so it is not imme-
diately clear how they will perform in a CSB problem.
We remark that adversarial analysis assumes uniformly
bounded observed rewards whereas we allow observed re-
wards to be unbounded. Additionally, the general adver-
sarial framework does not take advantage of the structure
present in CSB, namely that the adversary can only cor-
rupt a small fraction of rewards, so it is likely that perfor-
mance improvements can be made.
3.2 BEST OF BOTH WORLDS
A developing line of work is algorithms that enjoy “best
of both worlds” guarantees. That is, they perform well
in both stochastic and adversarial environments without
knowing a priori which environment they will face. Early
work in this area (Auer and Chiang, 2016; Bubeck and
Slivkins, 2012) started by assuming a stochastic environ-
ment and implementing some method to detect a failure of
the i.i.d. assumption on rewards, at which point the algo-
rithm switches to an algorithm for the adversarial environ-
ment for the remainder of iterations. Further work imple-
ments algorithms that can handle an environment that is
some mixture of stochastic and adversarial, as in EXP3++
and TsallisInf (Seldin and Slivkins, 2014; Zimmert and
Seldin, 2019).
While these algorithms are aimed well for a stochas-
tic environment with some adversarial rewards, they differ
from contamination robust algorithms in that all observed
rewards are thought to be informative. Their uncontami-
nated regret has not been analysed and therefore there are
no guarantees in the CSB setting.
3.3 CONTAMINATION ROBUST STATIS-
TICS
The ε-contamination model we consider is closely related
to the one introduced by Huber in 1964 (Huber, 1964).
Their goal was to estimate the mean of a Gaussian mix-
ture model where ε fraction of the sample was not sam-
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pled from the main Gaussian component. There has been
a recent increase of work using this model, especially in
extensions to the high-dimensional case (Diakonikolas et
al., 2019, Kothari, Steinhardt, and Steurer, 2018, Lai, Rao,
and Vempala, 2016, L. Liu, Li, and Caramanis, 2019).
These works often keep the assumption of a Gaussian
mixture component, though there has been expanding work
with non-Gaussian models as well.
3.4 CONTAMINATION ROBUST BANDITS
Some of the first work in CSB started by assuming both
rewards and contamination were bounded (Gupta, Koren,
and Talwar, 2019; Lykouris, Mirrokni, and Leme, 2018).
These works assume an adversary that can contaminate
at any time step, but that is constrained in the cumula-
tive contamination. They bound the cumulative max (over
actions) absolute difference of the contaminated reward,
x, to the true reward, r,
∑
t maxa |ra(t) − xa(t)| ≤ C.
Lykouris, Mirrokni, and Leme (2018) provides a layered
UCB-type active arm elimination algorithm. Gupta, Ko-
ren, and Talwar (2019) expands on this work to provide an
algorithm similar to active arm elimination in spirit, but
which never completely eliminates an action, and which
has better regret guarantees.
Recent work in implementing a robust UCB replaces
the empirical mean with the empirical median, and gives
guarantees for the uncontaminated regret with Gaussian
rewards (Kapoor, Patel, and Kar, 2018). They consider
an adaptive adversary but require the contamination to be
bounded, though the bound need not be known. They cite
work that can expand their robust UCB to distributions
with bounded fourth moments by using the agnostic mean
(Lai, Rao, and Vempala, 2016), though give no uncontam-
inated regret guarantees. In one dimension, the agnostic
mean takes the mean of the smallest interval containing
(1 − α) fraction of points. This estimator is also known
as the α-shorth mean. Our work expands on this model
by allowing for unbounded contamination and analysing
the uncontaminated regret for sub-Gaussian rewards when
implementing a UCB algorithm with the α-shorth mean.
CSB has also been analysed in the best arm identi-
fication problem (Altschuler, Brunel, and Malek, 2019).
Using a Bernoulli adversary that contaminates any reward
with probability ε, Altschuler, Brunel, and Malek (2019)
consider three adversaries of increasing power, from the
oblivious adversary, which does not know the player’s his-
tory nor the current action or reward, to a malicious adver-
sary, which can contaminate knowing the player’s history
and the current action and reward. They give analysis of
the probability of best arm selection and sample complex-
ity of an active arm elimination algorithm. While their
performance measure is different than ours, we generalize
their context to allow an adversary to contaminate in any
fashion.
There is also work that explores the impact of an adap-
tive adversarial contamination on ε-greedy and UCB al-
gorithms (Jun et al., 2018). They give a thorough anal-
ysis with both theoretical guarantees and simulations of
the effects an adversary can have on these two algorithms
when the adversary does not know the optimal action but
is otherwise fully adaptive. They show these standard al-
gorithms are susceptible to contamination. Similar work
looks at contamination in contextual bandits with a non-
adaptive adversary (Ma et al., 2019).
4 MAIN RESULTS
We present concentration bounds for both the α-shorth
and α-trimmed mean estimators in the ε-contamination
context for sub-Gaussian random variables.
Our contribution to the CSB problem is in providing
a contamination robust UCB algorithm that is simple to
implement and has theoretical regret guarantees close to
those of UCB algorithms in the uncontaminated setting.
4.1 CONTAMINATION ROBUST MEAN ES-
TIMATORS
The estimators we analyse have been in use for many
decades as robust statistics. Our contribution is to an-
alyze them within our ε-contamination model with sub-
Gaussian samples and provide simple finite-sample con-
centration inequalities for ease of use in UCB-type algo-
rithms.
4.1.1 Trimmed Mean
Our first estimator suggested for use in the contaminated
model is the α-trimmed mean (L. Liu, Li, and Caramanis,
2019).
α-trimmed mean Trim the smallest and largestα-fraction
of points from the sample and calculate the mean of the
remaining points. This estimator uses 1 − 2α fraction of
sample points.
The intuition being if the contamination is large, then
it will be removed from the sample. If it is small, it should
have little affect on the mean estimate. Next we provide
the concentration inequality for the α-trimmed mean.
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Algorithm 2: α-Trimmed Mean
input : Xn = (x1, ..., xn), α
output: α-trimmed mean
(x(1), ..., x(n)) = sorted Xn s.t. x(i) ≤ x(i+1)
cut = dα ∗ ne
return mean(x(cut), ..., x(n-cut))
Theorem 1 (Trimmed mean concentration). Let G be the
set of points x1, ...xn ∈ R that are drawn from a σ-sub-
Gaussian distribution with mean µ. Let Sn be a sample
where an ε-fraction of these points are contaminated by
an adversary. For ε ≤ α < 1/2, t ≥ n we have,
|trMeanα(Sn)− µ| ≤
σ
(1− 2α)
(√
4
n
log(t) + 4α
√
6 log(t)
)
with probability at least 1− 4t2 .
Proof follows from L. Liu, Li, and Caramanis (2019)
and can be found in the appendix.
4.1.2 Shorth Mean
The agnostic mean from Lai, Rao, and Vempala (2016),
which we use the more common term α-shorth mean for,
can be considered a variation of the trimmed mean.
α-shorth mean Take the mean of the shortest interval
that removes the smallest δ1 and largest δ2 fraction of
points such that δ1 + δ2 = α, where δ1, δ2 are chosen
to minimize the interval length of remaining points. Uses
1− α fraction of sample points.
The α-shorth mean is less computationally efficient
than the trimmed mean, but may be a better mean esti-
mator when the contaminated points are not large outliers
and are skewed in one direction. Intuitively this is because
the α-shorth mean can trim off contamination that would
require removing most of the sample with the trimmed
mean. Next we provide the concentration inequality for
the α-shorth mean.
Theorem 2 (α-shorth mean concentration). LetGn be the
set of points x1, ...xn ∈ R that are drawn from a σ-sub-
Gaussian distribution with mean µ. Let Sn be a sample
where an ε-fraction of these points are contaminated by
an adversary. For ε ≤ α < 1/3, t ≥ n, we have,
|sMeanα(Sn)− µ| ≤
σ
1− 2α
√
4
n
log t+
(6α− 8α2)σ
(1− 2α)(1− α)
√
6 log t
Algorithm 3: α-Shorth Mean
input : Xn = (x1, ..., xn), α
output: A mean estimate for the distribution of X
(x(1), ..., x(n)) = sorted Xn s.t. x(i) ≤ x(i+1)
nα = b(1− α) ∗ nc
I ∈ argmink{x(k+nα) − x(k)}
Choose uniformly at random from set I if there is
more than one starting index with the smallest
interval length
return sMean(X)← mean(x(I), ..., x(I+nα))
with probability at least 1− 4t2 .
Proof sketch. Without loss of generality assume µ = 0
for the underlying true distribution. Let G˜ ⊂ Gn repre-
sent the points which are not contaminated and C ⊂ Gn
represent the contaminated points. Then our sample can
be represented by the union Sn = G˜ ∪ C
Let J be the interval that contains the shortest 1 − α
fraction of Sn, I be the interval that contains G˜ (i.e. the
remaining good points after contamination), and T be the
interval that contains the points of Sn after trimming the
α largest and smallest fraction of points. Use |I| to denote
the length of interval I . It must be that I ∩ J 6= ∅ because
otherwise the points in I ∪ J would contain 2 − 2α > 1
fraction of Sn. Let c be a point in I ∩ J and x be a point
in J . Recall that trMeanα(Sn) is the trimmed mean of the
contaminated sample Sn. Then we have,
|x| ≤ |x− c|+ |c− trMeanα(Sn)|+ |trMeanα(Sn)|
≤ |J |+ |I|+ |trMeanα(Sn)|
≤ 2|I|+ |trMeanα(Sn)|
The second step comes from x and c both being in J and
because I ⊇ T . The third step comes from |J | ≤ |I|.
To bound the length of I we have,
|I| ≤ 2 max
x∈Gn
|x| w.p. at least 1− δ2.
Finally, since
|trMeanα(Sn)| ≤ 1
(1− 2α) (|x¯Gn |+ 4α maxx∈Gn |x|)
with probability at least 1−δ1−δ2, we get that for x ∈ J ,
|x| ≤ 4 max
i∈[n]
|xi|+ 1
(1− 2α) (|x¯Gn |+ 4α maxx∈Gn |x|)
=
|x¯Gn |
1− 2α +
(
4 +
4α
1− 2α
)
max
x∈Gn
|x|.
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Now that we have a bound on the contaminated points in
J , our analysis follows similarly as the trimmed mean by
bounding A1, A2, A3 as defined below.
|sMeanα(Sn)|
≤ 1
(1− α)n
(∣∣∣∣∑
x∈G˜
x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈G˜∩¬J
x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈C∩J
x︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
∣∣∣∣)
The full proof is contained in the appendix and follows
a similar approach as for the trimmed mean.
Our methods ensured that the first term in each con-
centration bound is the same, giving them similar regret
guarantees when implemented in a UCB algorithm. We
emphasize that the α-shorth mean uses 1−α fraction of a
sample while the α-trimmed mean uses 1−2α fraction of
a sample. We remark that if there is no contamination and
α = 0 then our inequalities reduce to the standard con-
centration inequality for the empirical mean of samples
drawn from a sub-Gaussian distribution.
4.2 CONTAMINATION ROBUST UCB
We present the contamination robust-UCB (crUCB) algo-
rithm for ε-CSB with sub-Gaussian rewards.
Algorithm 4: crUCB
input: number of actions K, time horizon T , upper
bound on fraction contamination α, upper
bound on sub-Gaussian constant σ0, mean
estimate function (α trimmed or shorth
mean) f .
for t ≤ K do
Pick action a when t = a.
end
for t > K do
for a ∈ [K] compute do
f(xa(t))← mean estimate of rewards.
Na(t)← number of times action has been
played.
end
Pick action At =
argmaxa∈[K]f(xa(t)) +
σ0
(1−2α)
(√
4 log(t)Na(t)
)
.
Observe reward xAt(t).
end
We provide uncontaminated regret guarantees for crUCB
below for both the α-trimmed and the α-shorth mean.
Theorem 3 (α-trimmed mean crUCB uncontaminated re-
gret). Let K > 1 and T ≥ K − 1. Then with algo-
rithm 4 with the α-trimmed mean, σ-sub-Gaussian re-
ward distributions with σa ≤ σ0, and contamination rate
ε ≤ α ≤ ∆min
4(∆min+4σ0
√
6 log T )
, we have the uncontami-
nated regret bound,
R¯(UCB) ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log T +
∑
15∆a.
Corollary 1 (α-trimmed mean crUCB uncontaminated re-
gret bounded rewards). If the rewards are bounded by b,
and have contamination rate ε ≤ α ≤ ∆min4(∆min+4b) , then
R¯T ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log(T ) +
∑
15∆a.
Theorem 4 (α-shorth mean crUCB uncontaminated re-
gret). Let K > 1 and T ≥ K − 1. Then with algorithm
4 with the α-shorth mean, sub-Gaussian reward distribu-
tions with σa ≤ σ0, and contamination rate ε ≤ α ≤
∆min
4(∆min+9σ0
√
6 log T )
, we have the uncontaminated regret
bound,
R¯(UCB) ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log T +
∑
15∆a.
Corollary 2 (α-shorth mean crUCB uncontaminated re-
gret bounded rewards). If the rewards are bounded by b,
and have contamination rate ε ≤ α ≤ ∆min4(∆min+9b) , then
R¯T ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log(T ) +
∑
15∆a.
Proofs for theorem 3 and 4 and their corollaries follow
standard analysis and are provided in the appendix.
From theorem 3 and 4 we get that crUCB has the same
order of regret in the CSB setting as UCB1 has in the stan-
dard sMAB setting. The constraint on the magnitude of ε
is quite strong, but we show in section 5 that they can be
broken and still obtain good empirical performance.
Remark Our bounds above do not allow ε to be too big
relative to the minimum suboptimality gap ∆min. This
is natural: if ε > ∆min then no algorithm can get sub-
linear regret since distinguishing between the top two ac-
tions is statistically impossible even with infinite samples.
We give a simple example in Appendix B. Furthermore,
it is possible to derive a regret bound1 of O˜(σ0
√
KT +
ασ0
1−4αT ) for any choice of α such that ε ≤ α < 1/4. The
linear term in regret (which is unavoidable for large ε)
may be acceptable if the corruption proportion is not very
large.
1The O˜(·) notation hides constants and logarithmic terms. See Ap-
pendix B for details.
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5 SIMULATIONS
We compare our crUCB algorithms using the trimmed
mean (tUCB) and shorth mean (sUCB) against a stan-
dard stochastic algorithm (UCB1, Auer and Nicolo Cesa-
Bianchi, 2002), a standard adversarial algorithm (EXP3,
Auer, Nicolo` Cesa-Bianchi, et al., 2002), two “best of
both worlds” algorithms (EXP3++, Seldin and Lugosi,
2017, 0.5-TsallisInf, Zimmert and Seldin, 2019), and an-
other contamination robust algorithm (RUCB-MAB, Kapoor,
Patel, and Kar, 2018). Each trial has five actions (K = 5),
is run for 1000 iterations (T = 1000), for ε ∈ {0.05, 0.1}.
For sUCB and tUCB, we set α = ε and σ0 = σ. The plots
are average results over 10 trials with error bars showing
the standard deviation.
Our choice of T comes from our motivation to apply
contaminated bandits in education, where the sample sizes
are often much smaller than for example in advertising.
While T = 1000 would be considered a large university
class, it still allows one to visually see regret for smaller
iterations and see how performance stabilizes. We simi-
larly chose number K of arms and proportion contamina-
tion ε to be in a realistic range for the application we have
in mind. All algorithms use recommended parameter set-
tings given within their respective papers.
Rewards and gaps We chose the reward distribution to
be binomial(n=10) to simulate likert scale and because
this distribution has bounded rewards and is not symmet-
ric for large p. For the optimal action, p = .9 and for
suboptimal actions p = .8, thus the suboptimality gap is
∆ = 1. All non-optimal actions have the same true distri-
bution.
Adversaries We focus on a Bernoulli adversary which
gives a contaminated reward at every time step with prob-
ability ε. We also implement a cluster adversary which
contaminates at the beginning of play to show the weak-
ness of algorithms to this type of attack.
Contamination We use a random malicious contami-
nation scheme which chooses a contaminated reward uni-
formly from ranges that increase suboptimal action means
and decrease the optimal action’s mean.
Performance measurement We plot the average regret
over 10 trials for 1000 iterations.
We recommend to view the plots on a color screen.
In Figure 1a we see that the adversarial and best of
both worlds algorithms, EXP3, EXP3++, and TsallisInf,
perform poorly in the purely stochastic setting compared
(a) ε = 0
(b) ε = 0.05
(c) ε = 0.1
Figure 1: Binomial Rewards With Varying Proportion Of
Contamination
to the UCB type algorithms. In Figure 1, we see the best
of these, TsallisInf, starts to degrade as the proportion of
contamination increases while the robust UCB algorithms
are only slightly affected. These simulations show a clear
performance benefit to using algorithms that specifically
account for contaminated rewards.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows that for both sUCB and
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(a) α = 0
(b) α = 0.05
(c) α = 0.1
Figure 2: Misspecified α For ε = 0.
tUCB, the choice of α is much less sensitive than choice
of σ. Over estimating or slightly underestimating α does
not degrade performance significantly. Underestimating σ
can give a significant boost to performance while over es-
timating can degrade it. This is consistent with the perfor-
mance of UCB algorithms in practice, which often scale
the exploration term to improve empirical performance
(Y.-E. Liu et al., 2014).
(a) sUCB
(b) tUCB
Figure 3: Regret Sensitivity For Various α.
To look at the impact of using a contamination robust
algorithm when there is no contamination, we plotted var-
ious α values when ε = 0, shown in Figure 2. Assuming
small amounts of contamination when there is none only
has a small impact on performance, suggesting it is per-
missible to use contamination robust methods when there
is uncertainty of contamination. Similarly, small K and
large ∆ can render bounded contamination impotent and
would not require algorithms that account for it.
We have included RUCB-MAB in our simulations be-
cause it is simple to implement and can perform similarly
well to our algorithms. We note it currently has guaran-
tees only for Gaussian rewards (Kapoor, Patel, and Kar,
2018).
Figure 5 shows the poor performance of all algorithms
when the first ε rewards are contaminated. TsallisInf and
EXP3++ show some recovery, but it is clear this type of
adversary is harmful. This remains an open problem for
scenarios with small T .
We also considered including the BARBAR algorithm
(Gupta, Koren, and Talwar, 2019) whose epoch scheme is
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(a) sUCB
(b) tUCB
Figure 4: Regret Sensitivity For Various σ.
the only algorithm we know that accounts for the front
cluster attack. We chose against this as for our setting of
T = 1000 the BARBAR algorithm only has one epoch,
and thus does not make any updates to the estimated gaps,
resulting in pure random exploration.
6 DISCUSSION
We have presented two variants of an ε-contamination ro-
bust UCB algorithm to handle uninformative or malicious
rewards in the stochastic bandit setting. As the main con-
tribution, we proved concentration inequalities for the α-
trimmed and α-shorth mean in the ε-contamination set-
ting with sub-Gaussian samples and guarantees on the un-
contaminated regret of the crUCB algorithms. The re-
gret guarantees are similar to those in the uncontaminated
sMAB setting.
We have shown through simulation that these algo-
rithms can outperform “best of both worlds” algorithms
and those for stochastic or adversarial environments when
using a small number of iterations and ε chosen to be rea-
(a) ε = .1
Figure 5: Front Cluster Attack
sonable when implementing bandits in education.
We highlight that our algorithms are simple to imple-
ment. In practice, it is often easy to find upper bounds on
the parameters which are robust to underestimation. Our
algorithms are numerically stable and have clear intuition
to their actions.
A weak point of these algorithms is they require knowl-
edge of α before hand. Choices of α may come from do-
main knowledge, but could also require a separate study.
In this work we assumed a fully adaptive adversarial
contamination, constrained only by the total fraction of
contamination at any time step. By making more assump-
tions about the adversary, it is likely possible to improve
uncontaminated regret bounds.
Limitations The adversary used in the simulation is quite
simple and does not take full advantage of the power we
allow in our model. We designed it as a first test of our
algorithms and associated theory. In the future, we would
like to design simulated adversaries that are modeled on
real world contamination. It will also be important to de-
ploy contamination robust algorithms in the real world.
This will require thought on how to select various tuning
parameters ahead of the deployment.
There remain many open questions in this area. In
particular, we think this work could be improved along
the following directions.
Randomized algorithms UCB-type algorithms are of-
ten outperformed in applications by the randomized Thomp-
son sampling algorithm. Creating a randomized algorithm
that accounts for the contamination model would increase
the practicality of this line of work.
9
Contamination correlated with true rewards One pos-
sibility is that the contaminated rewards contain informa-
tion of the true rewards. For example if contamination can
be missing data, we know dropout can be correlated with
the treatment condition.
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A Proofs
A.1 Theorem 1
Theorem 1 (Trimmed mean concentration). Let G be the set of points x1, ...xn ∈ R that are drawn from a σ-sub-
Gaussian distribution with mean µ. Let Sn be a sample where an ε-fraction of these points are contaminated by an
adversary. For ε ≤ α < 1/2, t ≥ n we have,
|trMeanα(Sn)− µ| ≤
σ
(1− 2α)
(√
4
n
log(t) + 4α
√
6 log(t)
)
with probability at least 1− 4t2 .
Proof of theorem 1. Without loss of generality assume µ = 0 for the underlying true distribution. For X ∼ σ-sub-
Gaussian, by definition, we have:
P
(
|X| ≥ µ+ η
)
≤ 2 exp(− η
2
2σ2
)
P
(
|x¯n − µ| ≥ σ
√
2
n
log
2
δ1
)
≤ δ1
and
P
(
max
i∈[n]
|Xi| ≥ t
)
≤ 2n exp
(
− t
2
2σ2
)
P
(
max
i∈[n]
|Xi| ≥ σ
√
2 log
2n
δ2
)
≤ δ2.
Let G˜ ⊂ Gn represent the points which are not contaminated and C ⊂ Gn represent the contaminated points. Then
our sample can be represented by the union Sn = G˜ ∪ C. Let R represent the points that remain after trimming α
fraction of the largest and smallest points, and T be the set of points that were trimmed. Then we have that.
|trMeanα(Sn)| =
∣∣∣∣ 1(1− 2α)n ∑
x∈R
x
∣∣∣∣
=
1
(1− 2α)n
∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈G˜∩R
x+
∑
x∈C∩R
x
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
(1− 2α)n
∣∣∣∣∑
x∈G˜
x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
−
∑
x∈G˜∩T
x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
+
∑
x∈C∩R
x︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
(1− 2α)n
(∣∣∣∣∑
x∈G˜
x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈G˜∩T
x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈C∩R
x︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
∣∣∣∣)
with
A1 =
∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈Gn
x−
∑
x∈Gn\G˜
x
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈Gn
x
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈Gn\G˜
x
∣∣∣∣ ≤ n|x¯Gn |+ εn maxx∈Gn |x| w.p. at least 1− δ1 − δ2,
A2 ≤ 2αn max
x∈Gn
|x| w.p. at least 1− δ2,
A3 ≤ εn max
x∈Gn
|x| w.p. at least 1− δ2.
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Combining we get,
|trMeanα(Sn)− µ| ≤ 1
(1− 2α)
(
|x¯Gn |+ max
x∈Gn
|x|(2ε+ 2α)
)
≤ 1
(1− 2α)
(
|x¯Gn |+ max
x∈Gn
|x|(4α)
)
≤ σ
(1− 2α)
(√
2
n
log
2
δ1
+ 4α
√
2 log
2t
δ2
)
with probability at least 1− δ1 − δ2. Letting δ1 = 2t2 and δ2 = 2t2 , and assuming α ≥ ε, we have,
|trMeanα(Sn)− µ| ≤ σ
(1− 2α)
(√
4
n
log(t) + 4α
√
6 log(t)
)
with probability at least 1− 4t2 .
A.2 Theorem 2
Theorem 2 (α-shorth mean concentration). Let Gn be the set of points x1, ...xn ∈ R that are drawn from a σ-sub-
Gaussian distribution with mean µ. Let Sn be a sample where an ε-fraction of these points are contaminated by an
adversary. For ε ≤ α < 1/3, t ≥ n, we have,
|sMeanα(Sn)− µ| ≤
σ
1− 2α
√
4
n
log t+
(6α− 8α2)σ
(1− 2α)(1− α)
√
6 log t
with probability at least 1− 4t2 .
Proof of theorem 2. Without loss of generality assume µ = 0 for the underlying true distribution. Let X ∼ σ-sub-
Gaussian.
We want to bound the impact of the contaminated points in our interval. Once we have this bound, the proof
follows just as in the trimmed mean.
Assume α < 1/3 and ε ≤ α. Let J be the interval that contains the shortest 1− α fraction of Sn, I be the interval
that contains G˜ (i.e. the remaining good points after contamination), and T be the interval that contains the points of
Sn after trimming the α largest and smallest fraction of points. Use |I| to denote the length of interval I . It must be
that I ∩ J 6= ∅ because otherwise the points in I ∪ J would contain 2 − 2α > 1 fraction of Sn. Let c be a point in
I ∩J and x be a point in J . Recall that trMeanα(Sn) is the trimmed mean of the contaminated sample Sn from above.
Then we have,
|x| ≤ |x− c|+ |c− trMeanα(Sn)|+ |trMeanα(Sn)|
≤ |J |+ |I|+ |trMeanα(Sn)|
≤ 2|I|+ |trMeanα(Sn)|
The second step comes from x and c both being in J and because I ⊇ T . The third step comes from |J | ≤ |I|.
To bound the length of I we have,
|I| ≤ 2 max
x∈Gn
|x| w.p. at least 1− δ2.
Finally, since
|trMeanα(Sn)| ≤ 1
(1− 2α) (|x¯Gn |+ 4α maxx∈Gn |x|)
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with probability at least 1− δ1 − δ2, we get that for x ∈ J ,
|x| ≤ 4 max
x∈Gn
|x|+ 1
(1− 2α) (|x¯Gn |+ 4α maxx∈Gn |x|) w.p. at least 1− δ1 − δ2,
=
|x¯Gn |
1− 2α +
(
4 +
4α
1− 2α
)
max
x∈Gn
|x|.
Now that we have a bound on the contaminated points in J , our analysis follows as before,
|sMeanα(Sn)|
≤ 1
(1− α)n
(∣∣∣∣∑
x∈G˜
x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈G˜∩¬J
x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈C∩J
x︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
∣∣∣∣)
where
A1 ≤ n|x¯Gn |+ εn max
x∈Gn
|x| w.p. at least 1− δ1 − δ2,
A2 ≤ αn max
x∈Gn
|x| w.p. at least 1− δ2,
A3 ≤ εn
(
|x¯Gn |
1− 2α +
(
4 +
4α
1− 2α
)
max
x∈Gn
|x|
)
w.p. at least 1− δ1 − δ2.
Combining we get,
|sMeanα(Sn)− µ|
≤ 1
(1− α)
(
|x¯Gn |
(
1 +
ε
1− 2α
)
+ max
x∈Gn
|x|(5ε+ α+ 4αε
1− 2α
))
≤ 1
(1− α)
(
|x¯Gn |
( 1− α
1− 2α
)
+ max
x∈Gn
|x|(6α+ 4α2
1− 2α
))
=
1
1− α
(
|x¯Gn |
( 1− α
1− 2α
)
+ max
x∈Gn
|x|6α− 8α
2
1− 2α
)
≤ σ
1− 2α
√
2
n
log
2
δ1
+
(6α− 8α2)σ
(1− 2α)(1− α)
√
2 log
2t
δ2
With probability at least 1− δ1 − δ2. Letting δ1 = 2t2 and δ2 = 2t2 , and assuming α ≥ ε, we have,
|sMeanα(Sn)− µ|
≤ σ
1− 2α
√
4
n
log t+
(6α− 8α2)σ
(1− 2α)(1− α)
√
6 log t
With probability at least 1− 4t2 .
A.3 Theorem 3
Theorem 3 (α-trimmed mean crUCB uncontaminated regret). Let K > 1 and T ≥ K − 1. Then with algorithm
4 with the α-trimmed mean, σ-sub-Gaussian reward distributions with σa ≤ σ0, and contamination rate ε ≤ α ≤
∆min
4(∆min+4σ0
√
6 log T )
, we have the uncontaminated regret bound,
R¯(UCB) ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log T +
∑
15∆a.
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Proof of theorem 3. First will show that E[Na(t)] <∞ for non-optimal actions. Assume Na(t) ≥ 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆2a
.
µˆa +
σ0
(1− 2α)
(√
4
Na(t)
log t+ 4α
√
6 log(t)
)
≤ µa + σi + σ0
(1− 2α)
(√
4
Na(t)
log t+ 4α
√
6 log(t)
)
w.p. at least 1− 4
t2
≤ µ∗ −∆a + 2σ0
(1− 2α)
(√
4
Na(t)
log t+ 4α
√
6 log(t)
)
≤ µ∗ −∆a + ∆a
2(1− 2α) +
2σ04α
(1− 2α)
√
6 log t Na(t) ≥ 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆2a
≤ µ∗ α ≤ ∆a
4(∆a + 4σ0
√
6 log(t))
≤ µˆ∗ + σi∗
(1− 2α)
(√
4
N∗(t)
log t+ 4α
√
6 log(t)
)
w.p. at least 1− 4
t2
≤ µˆ∗ + σ0
(1− 2α)
(√
4
N∗(t)
log t+ 4α
√
6 log(t)
)
.
Now to find E[Na(T )] for non-optimal actions.
E[Na(T )] = 1 + E
[ T∑
t=K+1
1{At = a}
]
= 1 + E
[ T∑
t=K+1
1
{
At = a,Na(t) ≤ 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆2a
}
+ 1
{
At = a,Na(t) >
64σ20 log(T )
∆2a
}]
≤ 1 + 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆2a
+
T∑
t=K+1
P
[
At = a,Na(t) >
64σ20 log(T )
∆2a
]
= 1 +
64σ20 log(T )
∆2a
+
T∑
t=K+1
P
[
At = a|Na(t) > 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆2a
]
P
[
Na(t) >
64σ20 log(T )
∆2a
]
≤ 1 + 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆2a
+
T∑
t=K+1
8
t2
≤ 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆2a
+ 15.
Finally, we can find the regret following the standard analysis,
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R¯ =
K∑
a=2
∆aE[Na(T )]
=
∑
∆a<∆
∆aE[Na(T )] +
∑
∆a≥∆
∆aE
[
Na(T )
]
≤ ∆T +
∑
∆a≥∆
[64σ20 log(T )
∆a
+ 15∆a
]
E[Na(t)] ≤ 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆a
+ 15
≤ 8σ0
√
KT log(T ) +
∑
15∆a ∆ =
√
64Kσ20 log(T )
T
.
A.4 Corollary 1
Corollary 1 (α-trimmed mean crUCB uncontaminated regret bounded rewards). If the rewards are bounded by b, and
have contamination rate ε ≤ α ≤ ∆min4(∆min+4b) , then
R¯T ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log(T ) +
∑
15∆a.
Proof of corollary 1. By replacing the part of the concentration bound for the trimmed mean that is based on the
maximum value in the sample with b, we get that,
|trMeanα(Sn)− µ| ≤ σ
(1− 2α)
√
4
n
log(t) +
4α
1− 2αb
with probability at least 1− 4t2 .
First will show that E[Na(t)] <∞ for non-optimal actions. Assume Na(t) ≥ 64σ
2
0 log(T )
∆2a
.
µˆa +
σ0
(1− 2α)
√
4
Na(t)
log t+
4α
1− 2αb
≤ µa + σi + σ0
(1− 2α)
√
4
Na(t)
log t+
8α
1− 2αb w.p. at least 1−
4
t2
≤ µ∗ −∆a + 2σ0
(1− 2α)
√
4
Na(t)
log t+
8α
1− 2αb
≤ µ∗ −∆a + ∆a
2(1− 2α) +
8α
(1− 2α)b Na(t) ≥
64σ20 log(T )
∆2a
≤ µ∗ α ≤ ∆a
4(∆a + 4b)
≤ µˆ∗ + σi∗
(1− 2α)
√
4
N∗(t)
log t+
4α
1− 2αb w.p. at least 1−
4
t2
≤ µˆ∗ + σ0
(1− 2α)
√
4
N∗(t)
log t+
4α
1− 2αb.
Results follow with a similar analysis as above.
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A.5 Theorem 4
Theorem 4 (α-shorth mean crUCB uncontaminated regret). Let K > 1 and T ≥ K − 1. Then with algorithm
4 with the α-shorth mean, sub-Gaussian reward distributions with σa ≤ σ0, and contamination rate ε ≤ α ≤
∆min
4(∆min+9σ0
√
6 log T )
, we have the uncontaminated regret bound,
R¯(UCB) ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log T +
∑
15∆a.
Proof of theorem 4. The proof for the contamination robust UCB using the α-shorth mean is similar to that of the
trimmed mean.
µˆa +
σ0
1− 2α
√
4
Na(t)
log t+
(6α− 8α2)σ
(1− 2α)(1− α)
√
6 log t
≤ µ∗ −∆a + 2σ0
1− 2α
√
4
Na(t)
log t+ 2
(6α− 8α2)σ0
(1− 2α)(1− α)
√
log t w.p.a.l 1− 4
t2
≤ µ∗ −∆a + ∆a
2(1− 2α) +
18ασ0
(1− 2α)
√
6 log t Na(t) ≥ 64σ
2
0 log(t)
∆2a
, α < 1/3
≤ µ∗ α ≤ ∆a
4(∆a + 9σ0
√
6 log t)
≤ µˆ∗ + σ0
1− 2α
√
4
N∗(t)
log t+
6α− 8α2σ
(1− 2α)(1− α)
√
6 log t
Using the analysis from the trimmed mean regret, we again get,
E[Na(t)] ≤ 64σ
2
0 log T
∆a
+
∑
15∆a
Using this value and standard regret analysis yields
R¯T ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log(T ) +
∑
15∆a.
A.6 Corollary 2
Corollary 2 (α-shorth mean crUCB uncontaminated regret bounded rewards). If the rewards are bounded by b, and
have contamination rate ε ≤ α ≤ ∆min4(∆min+9b) , then
R¯T ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log(T ) +
∑
15∆a.
Proof of corollary 2. By replacing the part of the concentration bound for the trimmed mean that is based on the
maximum value in the sample with b, we get that,
|sMeanα(Sn)− µ| ≤ σ
1− 2α
√
4
n
log t+
6α− 8α2
(1− 2α)(1− α)b
With probability at least 1− 4t2 .
Follow similar analysis as in section A.4 but setting constraint to be,
ε ≤ α ≤ ∆min
4(∆min + 9b)
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B Relationship of ε and ∆min
One quick example showing that ε > ∆min can prohibit sublinear regret is to consider the CSB game with two actions
and Bernoulli rewards. If a1 ∼ B(p) and a2 ∼ B(p − ε) then an adversary can choose all the contaminated rewards
for a2 to be 1 making it appear that a2 ∼ B(p). Thus the actions are indistinguishable to the learner.
However, we can still provide a bound for larger values of ε provided one is willing to tolerate a linear term in
the regret. We outline the argument only for the trimmed mean case since the argument for the shorth mean is very
similar. Note that argument for bounding E[Na(T )] in Theorem 3 works under the condition
α ≤ ∆a
4(∆a + 4σ0
√
6 log(T ))
.
Let S be the set of actions satisfying this condition. The arguments in the proof of Theorem 3 show that∑
a>1,a∈S
∆aE[Na(T )] ≤ 8σ0
√
KT log(T ) +
∑
a>1,a∈S
15∆a.
Therefore the bound of O˜(σ0
√
KT ) holds only for the regret due to actions a ∈ S. For any action a /∈ S, we have
∆a <
16ασ0
√
6 log(T )
1− 4α
assuming α < 0.25. The total regret contribution for a /∈ S is therefore
∑
a>1,a/∈S
∆aE[Na(T )] ≤ 16ασ0
√
6 log(T )
1− 4α
∑
a>1,a/∈S
E[Na(T )]
≤ 16ασ0
√
6 log(T )
1− 4α T
So the total regret is O˜(
√
KT + α1−4αT ).
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